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8 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
9 **EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**  
10

11 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,  
12 Plaintiff,  
13

14 v.  
15

16 NATHAN DANIEL LARSON,  
17 Defendant.  
18  
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Case No: 1:21-cr-00022 NONE/SKO

**STIPULATION TO CONTINUE JULY 23, 2021  
STATUS CONFERENCE TO SEPTEMBER 3,  
2021; ORDER**

20 This case is set for a status conference on July 23, 2021. Dkt. 42. On May 13, 2020, this Court  
21 issued General Order 618, which suspended all jury trials in the Eastern District of California “until  
22 further notice.” Under General Order 618, a judge “may exercise his or her authority to continue  
23 matters, excluding time under the Speedy Trial Act with reference to the court’s prior General Order 611  
24 issued on March 17, 2020 . . . with additional findings to support the exclusion in the Judge’s  
25 discretion.” General Order 618, ¶ 6 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020). In addition, any judge “may order case-  
26 by-case exceptions” to General Order 618’s provisions “at the discretion of that Judge or upon the  
27 request of counsel, after consultation with counsel and the Clerk of the Court to the extent such an order  
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1 will impact court staff and operations.” General Order 618, ¶ 7 (E.D. Cal. May 13, 2020). This and  
2 previous General Orders were entered to address public health concerns related to COVID-19.

3 Although the General Orders address the district-wide health concern, the Supreme Court has  
4 emphasized that the Speedy Trial Act’s end-of-justice provision “counteract[s] substantive  
5 openendedness with procedural strictness,” “demand[ing] on-the-record findings” in a particular case.  
6 *Zedner v. United States*, 547 U.S. 489, 509 (2006). “[W]ithout on-the-record findings, there can be no  
7 exclusion under” § 3161(h)(7)(A). *Id.* at 507. Moreover, any such failure cannot be harmless. *Id.* at  
8 509; *see also United States v. Ramirez-Cortez*, 213 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2000) (explaining that a  
9 judge ordering an ends-of-justice continuance must set forth explicit findings on the record “either orally  
10 or in writing”).

11 Based on the plain text of the Speedy Trial Act—which *Zedner* emphasizes as both mandatory  
12 and inexcusable—General Orders 611, 612, 617, and 618 require specific supplementation. Ends-of-  
13 justice continuances are excludable only if “the judge granted such continuance on the basis of his  
14 findings that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and  
15 the defendant in a speedy trial.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7)(A). Moreover, no such period is excludable  
16 unless “the court sets forth, in the record of the case, either orally or in writing, its reason or finding that  
17 the ends of justice served by the granting of such continuance outweigh the best interests of the public  
18 and the defendant in a speedy trial.” *Id.*

19 The General Orders exclude delay in the “ends of justice.” 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (Local Code  
20 T4). Although the Speedy Trial Act does not directly address continuances stemming from pandemics,  
21 natural disasters, or other emergencies, this Court has discretion to order a continuance in such  
22 circumstances. For example, the Ninth Circuit affirmed a two-week ends-of-justice continuance  
23 following Mt. St. Helens’ eruption. *Furlow v. United States*, 644 F.2d 764 (9th Cir. 1981). The court  
24 recognized that the eruption created “appreciable difficulty” for the trial to proceed. *Id.* at 767-69; *see*  
25 *also United States v. Correa*, 182 F. Supp. 326, 329 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citing *Furlow* to exclude time  
26 following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the resultant public emergency).

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1 The coronavirus is posing a similar, albeit much more enduring, “appreciable difficulty” to the  
 2 prompt proceedings mandated by the statutory rules. Recently, the Ninth Circuit enumerated a “non-  
 3 exhaustive” list of seven factors it found to be “relevant” in considering ends-of-justice Speedy Trial Act  
 4 continuances “in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic.” *United States v. Olsen*, --- F.3d ---, 2021 WL  
 5 1589359 at \*7 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. Apr. 23, 2021). That non-exhaustive list includes: (1) whether a defendant is  
 6 detained pending trial; (2) how long a defendant has been detained; (3) whether a defendant has invoked  
 7 speedy trial rights since the case’s inception; (4) whether a defendant, if detained, belongs to a  
 8 population that is particularly susceptible to complications if infected with the virus; (5) the seriousness  
 9 of the charges defendant faces, and in particular whether the defendant is accused of violent crimes; (6)  
 10 whether there is a reasons to suspect recidivism if the charges against the defendant are dismissed; and  
 11 (7) whether the district court has the ability to safely conduct a trial. *Id.*

12 In light of the foregoing, this Court should consider the following case-specific facts in finding  
 13 excludable delay appropriate in this particular case under the ends-of-justice exception, § 3161(h)(7)  
 14 (Local Code T4). If continued, this Court should designate a new date for this matter’s next status  
 15 conference. *United States v. Lewis*, 611 F.3d 1172, 1176 (9th Cir. 2010) (noting any pretrial  
 16 continuance must be “specifically limited in time”).

## 18 STIPULATION

19 THE PARTIES HEREBY STIPULATE, through their respective attorneys of record, Assistant  
 20 United States Attorney Brian W. Enos, counsel for the government, and Peter M. Jones, counsel for  
 21 defendant Nathan Daniel Larson (“defendant”), that this action’s **Friday, July 23, 2021 status**  
 22 **conference be continued to Friday, September 3, 2021, at 9:30 a.m.** The parties likewise ask the  
 23 court to endorse this stipulation by way of formal order.

24 The parties base this stipulation on good cause. Specifically,

- 25 1. On May 19, 2021, the government filed a motion for (1) a mental examination to determine  
 26 defendant’s competency, as well as a (2) subsequent competency hearing. Dkt. 24. On June  
 27 2, 2021, defense counsel filed its response brief, wherein it joined in the government’s

- 1 motion and further asked the court to order defendant's sanity likewise to be examined,  
2 pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 4242(a), at the same time as the competency examination. Dkt. 31,  
3 1:26-28 and 7:8-12.
- 4 2. On June 11, 2021, the court held a hearing on the above motions, and granted them after  
5 hearing and considering the views of both counsel and defendant. Dkts. 42 and 44. As a  
6 result, the court ordered defendant "committed to the custody of the U.S. Bureau of Prisons  
7 for the period of examination for placement in a suitable facility, and the U.S. Marshal's  
8 Service is directed to transfer him to a suitable facility for examination, with the court  
9 recommending a suitable facility within a reasonable proximity to this District." Dkt. 44,  
10 2:18-22. The court also set a status conference for July 23, 2021 to discuss the status of  
11 defendant's above examinations. Dkt. 42.
- 12 3. By June 23, 2021, counsel had heard from the Bureau of Prisons' Lisa Matthews, Chief  
13 Psychologist at the Bureau of Prison's Metropolitan Detention Center (MDC) in Los  
14 Angeles, wherein she (1) advised that defendant had been designated to MDC-LA and (2)  
15 asked for various types of records from the parties to assist with the examinations.
- 16 4. As of July 23, neither the parties nor the court have received any reports of examination  
17 regarding either defendant's competency or sanity at the times of the offenses charged.  
18 MDC-LA has likewise not indicated to either party or the court that the examinations have  
19 been completed. As a result, the parties have discussed this issue with chambers and  
20 pursuant to the same have identified September 3, 2021 as a continued status conference  
21 wherein both parties and the court could attend to discuss any updates to the status of  
22 defendant's examinations.
- 23 5. The parties therefore stipulate that the period of time from July 23, 2021, through September  
24 3, 2021, is deemed excludable pursuant to: (1) 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(A) because the  
25 examinations to determine the mental capacity of the defendant as described above remain  
26 ongoing; as well as (2) 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) and (iv) because it  
27 results from a continuance granted by the Court at the parties' request on the basis of the  
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1 Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best  
2 interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

3 IT IS SO STIPULATED.

4 Dated: July 23, 2021

PHILLIP A. TALBERT  
Acting United States Attorney

5  
6 By: /s/ Brian W. Enos  
Brian W. Enos  
Assistant United States Attorney

7  
8 *(As authorized 7/23/21)*

9 Dated: July 23, 2021

10 By: /s/ Peter M. Jones  
Peter M. Jones, Esq.  
Attorney for Defendant  
Nathan Daniel Larson

**ORDER**

IT IS ORDERED that the status hearing currently set for July 23, 2021, at 8:30 am is continued until September 3, 2021, at 9:30 am.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED THAT the period of time from July 23, 2021, through September 3, 2021, is deemed excludable pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(1)(A) because the examinations to determine the mental capacity of the defendant as described above remain ongoing; as well as 18 U.S.C. §§ 3161(h)(7)(A) and 3161(h)(7)(B)(i) and (iv) because it results from a continuance granted by the Court at defendants' request on the basis of the Court's finding that the ends of justice served by taking such action outweigh the best interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: July 23, 2021

  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE